

Honeywell, Precision Landing Systems

GBAS Approval Process



Agenda

- FAA System Design Approval
 - -Integrity Panel

- Ionosphere Mitigation
- GBAS Approval by Country
- GAST-D (CAT II/III)

GBAS Certification Phases

- System Design Approval (SDA) Manufacturer
 - Ground station system design meets requirements
 - Developed to appropriate design assurance levels
 - Accuracy, integrity, availability requirements satisfied

Facility Approval – Owner/ANSP/Airport

- Ground station installed properly, safely
- Approach plates/procedures developed
- Signal-in-space, coverage volume verified, approaches verified
- Maintenance technicians trained, certified

Service Approval – Operator/Airline

- Aircraft equipped
- Pilot crews trained
- Control tower personnel trained

FAA approved 2009 BAF approved 2011

Bremen, Germany Newark, New Jersey Houston, Texas Malaga, Spain Sydney, Australia Frankfurt, Germany



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
FAA System Design Approval Honeywell

GBAS CAT I Approval Steps

- To be approved the system must meet ICAO, FAA and/or other recognized standard
- The standard for SmartPath is the FAA LAAS Specification 3017 which also traces to the ICAO requirements



Customer Requirements



Secondary Requirements

Honeywell

•DO-246C, GBAS Signal in Space
•DO-245A, MASPS for GBAS
•Mil-Std-461E, Electromagnetic Interference
•Mil-Std-810F, Environmental Tests
•FAA-G-2100G, Electronic Equipment
•ED-114, MOPS for GBAS

Process Requirements ARP-4754, Certification Considerations ARP-4761, Safety Process DO-278/DO-178, Software DO-254, Hardware

GBAS CAT I Approval Plan


GBAS Approval Plan

Provides the FAA with Honeywell's plan to achieve design approval for the GBAS system

- Approval basis includes

- Requirements
- Compliance method
- Data
- Schedule
- Responsibilities


GBAS CAT I Approval Plan



FAA Approval Process

- System Design Approval Plan CAT I Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)
 - Provides top-level SDA plans and activities for use by FAA personnel
- System Design Approval Process And Procedures for The CAT I Local Area Augmentation System
 - Defines the evaluation criteria for all reviews necessary to accomplish System Design Approval
- These documents describe the objectives, activities and documentation to:
 - Verify compliance to the requirements
 - Define design data that substantiates compliance
 - Document accepted configuration

FAA System Design Approval



Safety Definitions

- Integrity The probability of transmitting out-oftolerance navigation data for 3-seconds or longer in any 150-second interval
- Continuity The probability of an unscheduled interruption of the VHF transmission for 3-seconds or longer in any 15 second interval
- Availability The proportion of time during which service is provided, computed over a long period (typically a year)


Safety Requirements

- Severe-Major Hazard Classification
 - Approach Integrity due to LGF failure, anomalous environmental or atmospheric effects – 1.5 x 10⁻⁷ in 150seconds
 - Approach Integrity under fault free or no more than Reference Receiver fault – 5 x 10⁻⁸ in 150-seconds
- Minor Hazard Classification
 - Unscheduled interruption of VDB transmission (Loss of Continuity) 1.0 x 10⁻⁶ in 15-seconds
 - Unscheduled loss of sufficient Reference Receivers or Ranging Sources (Loss of Continuity) – 2.3 x 10⁻⁶ in 15seconds
- Availability 0.99 (goal)

LAAS Integrity Panel

- Purpose
 - Ensure GBAS integrity monitors address defined GPS threats
- Team

- Honeywell, FAA (10), Subject Matter Experts (11 Key Technical Advisors)
- Process
 - 10 years development
 - 20 Technical Interchange Meetings
 - Review development of integrity monitors
 - Approve integrity monitors




Integrity Algorithms

| SCAT I | GAST-C | GAST-D | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| SCAT I Operations (1998) | CAT I Operations | CAT I Operations | CAT II/III Operations |
| Broadcast Msg Type 1, 2 & 4 | Broadcast Msg Type 1, 2 & 4 | Broadcast Msg Type 1, 2 & 4 | Broadcast Message Type 11 |
| | Sigma PR Ground | Sigma PR Ground | |
| | Phase Center Non-Zero Mean | Phase Center Non-Zero Mean | |
| | Ground System Sigma Monitor | Ground System Sigma Monitor | |
| | Ionosphere Anomaly Monitor | Ionosphere Anomaly Monitor | |
| | Troposphere Anomaly Monitor | Troposphere Anomaly Monitor | |
| | Ephemeris Monitor | Ephemeris Monitor | |
| | Signal Deformation Monitor | Signal Deformation Monitor | |
| | Low Satellite Signal Power Monitor | Low Satellite Signal Power Monitor | |
| | Code Carrier Divergence Monitor | Code Carrier Divergence Monitor | |
| | Excessive Acceleration Monitor | Excessive Acceleration Monitor | Excessive Acceleration Monitor |
| | Executive Monitor | Executive Monitor | Executive Monitor |
| | RFI Above the Mask | RFI Above the Mask | |
| | Iono Screening Real Time Inflation | Iono Screening Real Time Inflation | |
| | Constellation Alerts | Constellation Alerts | |
| | Broadband RFI Monitor | Broadband RFI Monitor | |
| | | | Cross Correlation Monitor |
| | | | Iono Gradient Monitor |

GAST-C provides foundation for **GAST-D**

CAT III monitors developed

FAA System Design Approval





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
Ionosphere Mitigation



Ionosphere Threat Model


- Independent ionosphere analysis performed by following countries
 - United States
 - Germany
 - Spain
 - Australia
 - Switzerland
 - Brazil
- Approved Honeywell GBAS addresses mid-latitude iono
- Honeywell is developing an update to address low-latitude iono

Rare Anomalous Iono






Iono Error at Decision Height



Iono Scintillation





Impacts availability of GBAS

Equatorial Scintillation

- Amplitude and phase of GPS signals change rapidly
- Degradation of measurements
 - Enhanced error

- Loss-of-lock of satellite signals
 - Degradation of geometry, less accuracy, availability issue
- Occurs local sunset to local midnight







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GBAS Approval by Country



Germany

- Country requirements for type certification
- Top level requirements: ICAO
- Honeywell responsible to obtain type certification with BAF



Germany - Requirements

- NfL II-51/08, Notification concerning the requirements for type-certification of GBAS ground facilities as aeronautical radionavigation stations
 - System safety and security
 - ICAO Annex 10, Volume 1
 - ARP4761, Safety Assessment Process
 - Software requirements
 - Developed according to EUROCAE ED-109
 - Technical functional requirements
 - ICAO Annex 10, Volume 1
 - Tests per EUROCAE ED-114
 - Ground and Flight inspections per ICAO Doc 8071 chapter 4
 - All weather operations, NfL I-1/99
 - Remote monitoring
 - Environmental requirements
 - ED-114
 - NfL I-328/01, Guidelines Concerning Obstacle Clearance for Instrument Runways

Germany - Requirements

- NfL II-51/08, Notification concerning the requirements for type-certification of GBAS ground facilities as aeronautical radionavigation stations
 - Facility Documentation
 - Installation manual
 - Technical system description
 - Operators manual
 - Maintenance manual
 - Legal telecommunication requirements
 - Declaration of conformity to radio equipment and telecommunications standards
 - Applicable to Cat I operations
 - Independent audit of Honeywell's FAA SDA data package

Spain

- Top level requirements: FAA specification
- Aena prepared approval package for certification authority



Australia

- Top level requirements: FAA specification
- Airservices Australia prepared approval package for certification authority
- Certification authority CASA participated in FAA audits



Switzerland

- Switzerland approval agency stated that they don't approve NAVAIDS. It is the responsibility of the ANSP to purchase an approved system.
- Switzerland approval agency is interested to see safety case for how the new NAVAID is integrated into the airport's operation
- Honeywell provided a documentation package that defines the SmartPath system



Brazil

- Top level requirements: ICAO
- Approval agency ICEA is working with the FAA on approval of the Honeywell SmartPath for low-latitude
 - ICEA participates in FAA audit meetings
- ICEA needs to address iono threat model for Brazil
 - Independent iono analysis
 - Honeywell iono analysis
- Honeywell will submit design approval documents to ICEA





India

- Top level requirements: ICAO
- Honeywell will submit approval documents to Airports Authority of India and approval agency DGCA





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GAST-D (CAT II/III)



GAST-D (CAT II/III)

- Honeywell has initiated an FAA approval plan for a GAST-D system
- Core architecture unchanged from GAST-C SLS-4000 system
- Two new monitors for GAST-D
- Requirements prototyped and validated by the FAA

